India-Japan modern diplomatic relations formally began on April 28, 1952. The two countries’ ties have been stronger than ever during the tenures of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In the sidelines of ASEAN regional forum of 2007 in Manila, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formalised the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which was again revived in 2017 in Manila. From “India Japan Strategic and Global Partnership” to “Special and Strategic Global Partnership,” this shift has played an effective role in expanding the relationship between these two countries to encompass bilateral diplomatic, military, and economic cooperation.

The institutionalisation of this elevated partnership found a consequential expression in the inaugural India-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial meeting, commonly known as 2+2 dialogue held in 2019 in New Delhi, which has been taking place biennially since then. This dialogue marked a structural deepening in the bilateral engagement, moving beyond periodic summit diplomacy towards a regularised mechanism for coordinating and cooperating positions on Security, Trade and issues of regional importance.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) initiative was one of the remarkable collaborations forged through the India-Japan cooperation to counter China’s assertive presence in the region. These two countries’ leaders have focused on the stability of the Indo-Pacific region, where core values such as democracy, peace, the rule of law, tolerance, and respect for the environment are upheld. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe appreciated Prime Minister Modi’s active engagement with the “East Act Policy”, where India focuses on a strategic diplomatic and economic initiative to deepen relations with the nations of Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. Modi’s stance on the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” strengthened relations globally, with an emphasis on Japan as well. However, the idea of FOIP initiative was conceptualised as early as August 2007, when President Abe addressed the Indian Parliament and delivered his landmark speech, “Confluence of the two seas.” Abe called for the fusion of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans as the “seas of freedom and of prosperity,” with India and Japan as the natural anchors of this broader Maritime Order. This speech preceded the formal FOIP initiative by nearly a decade, but its conceptual pillars – democratic values, Maritime rules, and the civilisational complementarity of the two nations remained the philosophical basis of the partnership throughout the Modi-Abe era.

A rules-based order and the provision of regional public goods were two of the issues that the Quad members sought to address, without imposing on smaller Southeast Asian countries the choice of aligning with great powers. Indo-Pacific cooperation has been instrumental in establishing peace in the region, which has improved during the Abe and Modi periods.

Both leaders also recognised the need to upgrade the traditional economic relationship, with an inclusion of Hard Security measures. One of the major steps taken forward was the signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) pertaining to Military Cooperation in September 2020. The logistics deal granted the Indian and Japanese navies access to Joint Military Infrastructure for the supply and maintenance of equipments. Such an approach can be seen as a pragmatic way of increasing the naval presence of both countries in the Indian and Pacific oceans without the need for additional international bases. The strategic significance of ACSA extended beyond administrative convenience. By enabling real-time logistical support across each other’s naval assets, the agreement extended the official reach of both the navies into the contested littorals without requiring either countries to seek permanent basing arrangements. This approach reflected a shared preference for what might be termed as ‘functional presence’ over formal commitment, a posture consistent with India’s longstanding resistance to alliance entanglement, and Japan’s constitutional constraints on collective self-defence.

In addition to bilateral agreements, Joint Military exercises were added to the diplomatic agenda. The Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) evolved into an extensive exercise with complex live-fire scenarios and advanced anti-submarine warfare training. In 2015, Japan was also inducted as a permanent member of the Malabar Naval Exercise with the United States and India. This Trilateral Naval Cooperation enhanced their capacity to communicate and function together efficiently in the event of a maritime crisis. These exercises took place in sensitive waters in the region, further demonstrating India and Japan’s commitment to freedom of navigation and the security of the Indian Ocean region.

Parallel to these exercise frameworks, the two governments formalised a Defence Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreement (DETTA) in 2015, establishing the legal and procedural basis for shared development and transfer of defence technology.

These overarching security goals were directly backed by economic initiatives. The Prime Minister Abe shared his expertise and Official Development Assistance (ODA) with India, providing technological support for its development initiatives, including “Make in India” and “Skill India.” The Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (MAHAVyay and MAHAMitra) project emerged as a clear example of bilateral trust. Another area in which Japan was actively involved in India was the Northeast and Andaman and Nicobar Islands with regard to Strategic Infrastructure Investments. Their initiatives aimed at enhancing regional connectivity toward the Bay of Bengal, offering a clear and strong alternative to development through indebtedness offered by other regional powers. The institutional vehicle for these investments was the Japan-India Act East Forum, established in 2017 on the sidelines of the annual summit. The Forum served as the primary coordination mechanism between the two governments for infrastructure, connectivity, and development projects in India’s northeasern states and island territories. Its establishment was significant not merely for the objective it was to serve, but also for what it represented diplomatically – Japan aligning with India’s strategic calculus regarding its eastern periphery, offering investments transparent in their terms, and devoid of the conditionalities that have drawn criticism towards Chinese infrastructure investments across the border region.

Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe made history as architects of a new geopolitical equation in Asia. They overcame historical hesitation and built a robust defence and economic infrastructure. Their institutional structures continue to date, working in the modern inter-governmental structures and include logistic deals, a 2+2 dialogue format, and a revived Quad. In this regard, the India-Japan partnership is becoming an integral part of the security architecture intended to guarantee peace and openness in the Indo-Pacific region. They have together built a framework robust enough to outlast their diplomatic chemistry that produced it.