In September 2026, the BRICS leaders will convene in New Delhi for the BRICS annual summit. The bloc is on the brink of a development that will have far-reaching repercussions beyond trade and monetary policy. Recent reports suggest that approximately 65 percent of intra-BRICS trade transactions are currently resolved in national currencies, while the proportion denominated in US dollars has decreased to approximately 35 percent. This transformation is crucial from a geopolitical standpoint because the international banking system has long acted as both an economic infrastructure and a vital source of information for the United States and its allies. As more transactions shift outside of dollar-based channels, financial flows that were formerly more transparent to Western institutions become more difficult to watch, track, and explain. As a consequence, a developing intelligence blind spot exists, in which the loss of dollar supremacy may diminish the visibility of critical economic activities across an expanding BRICS network.

For intelligence agencies that have historically depended on dollar-based transaction data to monitor terrorist financing, evasion, and illicit financial transfers, the proliferation of alternative settlement mechanisms poses an increasing strategic challenge. As BRICS nations increasingly employ national currencies and financial channels other than the dollar, Western intelligence agencies may find it more difficult to track transactions, identify middlemen, and reconstruct financial networks. This results in fragmented financial visibility, necessitating that intelligence agencies compile information from various regulatory systems and jurisdictions, rather than complete invisibility. This could potentially erode one of the most critical sources of financial intelligence available to the United States and its allies in the long term.

Building a Financial System Beyond the Dollar

The infrastructure for this transformation is taking shape with the BRICS Bridge, a payment system meant to link member nations’ central bank digital currencies. By facilitating direct transfers between central bank digital wallets, the system can decrease dependence on correspondent institutions and expedite cross-border settlements by reducing their dependence on traditional dollar-based channels. Its development roughly builds on Project mBridge, a China-backed project that had handled more than $55 billion in cross-border transactions by January 2026, with the digital yuan accounting for more than 95 percent of settlement volumes. With the completion of the mBridge pilot phase and the impending commercial deployment, BRICS is transitioning from the concept of alternative payments to the development of a functional financial infrastructure that is not dominated by the traditional Western system.

Additionally, the transformation is becoming apparent in the manner in which the BRICS institutions development and engage in strategic commodity trade. The New Development Bank has set a goal of 30 percent of its funding in members’ native currencies and is ready to issue its first rupee-denominated bond following yuan and rand bonds. Simultaneously, BRICS nations have began testing blockchain-based digital settlement for energy trade in the Gulf, including a live transaction in which an oil shipment was priced, invoiced, and paid without reference to the USD. These trends show that de-dollarization is spreading beyond payment systems to development financing and the settlement of vital commodities, forming a steadily more autonomous financial ecosystem from the dollar-based system.

The Changing Landscape of Financial Intelligence

The emerging BRICS financial architecture presents a challenge of access for financial intelligence and counter terrorism analysts, rather than the complete disappearance of financial trails. The global financial surveillance system, which has been influenced by the Financial Action Task Force standards and is further bolstered by the central role of dollar-based correspondent banking, has historically enabled Western authorities to acquire a wealth of information regarding cross-border transactions. As financial activity transitions to alternative settlement networks, Western authorities may have less direct access to transaction data and may rely more on BRICS institutions for information. Consequently, the primary concern is not that these transactions become impossible to trace, but rather that their tracing may become more reliant on financial authorities outside of the Western intelligence system.

The strategic incentive that underpins this transition is most evident in Russia, where sanctions have generated a compelling demand for payment channels that are less susceptible to Western financial constraints. The implications, however, are not confined merely to Russia. If central bank digital currencies and alternative settlement networks become extensively utilized for cross-border transactions, Western agencies may have more difficulties identifying financial intermediaries, reconstructing transaction networks, and discovering criminal activities in real time. BRICS members, by contrast, would retain greater oversight of transactions conducted through their own digital financial infrastructure, potentially reducing the extent to which such activity remains accessible to Western financial intelligence agencies. This creates a significant asymmetry in financial intelligence, with transaction data remaining highly visible to participating states while becoming less accessible to external intelligence services.

This emerging asymmetry also addresses the issue of how BRICS can address illicit within an increasingly autonomous financial system. Analysts have suggested the establishment of a BRICS Financial Disruption Mechanism to oversee channels such as hawala, narcotics trafficking, shell corporations, illicit markets, and crypto asset-based terrorist financing. Its success, however, would be contingent on member governments’ willingness to exchange financial information and coordinate enforcement actions. This collaboration could be complicated by variations in national regulations, institutional capacities, and strategic priorities, rendering information sharing a critical evaluation of whether BRICS can transform their increased financial autonomy into a credible framework for financial security.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) poses a particularly intricate aspect of this evolving intelligence landscape. Since joining BRICS in 2024, the UAE has been increasingly integrated within the organization while maintaining close intelligence ties with Israel’s Mossad and Unit 8200. This places Abu Dhabi in a strategically significant position as BRICS develops alternative channels for financial and transactional data. This emerging system has the potential to provide the UAE with valuable visibility into trade and financial transactions involving countries such as Iran and Russia. However, the extent of this access would be contingent upon the architecture and data sharing arrangements of BRICS payment networks. If these systems grow more reliant on decentralized and peer-to-peer settlement, knowing who has access to, interprets, and acts on transactional data will become a key aspect of competitive financial intelligence.

A Divided Approach to De Dollarization

Not all BRICS members share the same enthusiasm for de-dollarization. The establishment of a common BRICS currency has been opposed by India. Brazil has also stated that it is not currently considering such a proposal. This indicates that the grouping’s monetary strategy focuses on increasing flexibility in how members undertake cross-border transactions rather than replacing the dollar with a single alternative currency.

India has instead promoted functional de-dollarization by interconnecting national payment systems, increasing the usage of local currencies, and integrating central bank digital currencies. RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra has emphasized current conversations among the BRICS nations about integrating rapid payment systems and researching digital currencies to enable cross-border payments quicker and less expensive. This strategy enables members to maintain monetary sovereignty while lowering reliance on dollar-based settlement systems.

However, even functional de-dollarization has strategic consequences for financial intelligence. Direct local currency settlements might eliminate the requirement for transactions to go via US correspondent banks, lowering the number of places where Western financial institutions can monitor and handle cross-border financial activity. As a result, the increased efficiency and independence enjoyed by the BRICS members may lead to a less cohesive intelligence environment, which might make it harder for outside players to track financial movements using the current world surveillance system.

Conclusion

The BRICS de-dollarization has geopolitical implications that go beyond the future role of the US dollar. It increasingly concerns who controls financial infrastructure, who can access transactional data and whose institutions can interpret global financial flows. As BRICS develops alternative payment methods, it will need to increase cooperation against money laundering while also establishing a financial architecture that can sustain credibility outside Western institutions.

The problem for the West will be how to adapt financial intelligence to a more fragmented global economy. The long-term test for BRICS will be whether more financial autonomy can be paired with efficient supervision and information sharing. Ultimately, the emergent financial order will be influenced by the control of the networks through which money flows, as well as the currency that dominates global trade.