The story of 9/11 did not end just with the destruction of the World Trade Centre. It transformed the way the international community understood terrorism, national security and counter-terrorism. The attacks brought terrorism to the centre of global politics and triggered the American-led “Global War on Terror,” beginning with Afghanistan and eventually extending to Iraq.

Yet one of the striking features of the post-9/11 international order was that the world was attempting to fight terrorism without having a universally agreed legal definition of terrorism. The United Nations had developed many sectoral conventions addressing specific acts, such as aircraft hijacking, hostage-taking, terrorist bombing and terrorist financing, but Member States had not agreed upon a single comprehensive definition. The UN itself acknowledges that negotiations on a comprehensive convention remain unfinished. (United Nations)

9/11 and the Transformation of Counter-Terrorism

For the United States, 9/11 represented a fundamental shift from treating terrorism primarily as a law-enforcement challenge to treating it as a strategic and military threat. The US response began with Afghanistan, where al-Qaeda’s leadership was based under Taliban protection, but the American counter-terrorism framework rapidly expanded. The USA PATRIOT Act strengthened investigative and information-sharing powers; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 by bringing together 22 agencies and offices; and intelligence, border security, aviation security and counter-terrorism capabilities were reorganised. (Department of Homeland Security) The United States also developed a broader strategy combining military, diplomatic, financial, intelligence and law-enforcement instruments, reflecting the recognition that terrorist organisations could not be addressed solely through conventional military force.

But the expansion of the American response also exposed a fundamental problem: who gets to decide what constitutes terrorism? Without a universally accepted definition, the designation of actors could become politically contested. The UN has consequently emphasised both the need for a comprehensive framework and the importance of ensuring that definitions are sufficiently precise so that counter-terrorism laws are not applied arbitrarily or excessively. (United Nations)

India’s Early Push for a Global Definition

For India, this problem was not new in 2001. India had already experienced terrorism for decades and had been arguing for a comprehensive international legal framework well before 9/11. In 1996, India took the initiative to circulate a draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the United Nations. The objective was to establish a comprehensive legal framework through which terrorist acts could be addressed consistently across jurisdictions. (Ministry of External Affairs)

The significance of India’s position is that it approaches terrorism primarily as a universal security and legal problem, rather than one that should be defined according to the strategic interests of individual states. India has repeatedly argued that there should be no double standards in dealing with terrorism and that perpetrators, organisers, financiers and supporters must be held accountable. The continuing absence of consensus on CCIT therefore remains a major gap in the international counter-terrorism architecture. As recently as October 2025, India reiterated at the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee that the conclusion of CCIT remained elusive and called for renewed political will. (United Nations)

From the War on Terror to a More Comprehensive Security Architecture

The two decades after 9/11 also demonstrated that terrorism could not be addressed simply through military operations. Terrorist organisations adapted to new technologies, decentralised their structures, exploited cyberspace, raised funds through increasingly sophisticated networks and used social media for recruitment and radicalisation. The international response consequently expanded towards terrorist financing, terrorist travel, online radicalisation, weapons proliferation, border security, intelligence-sharing and emerging technologies.

The UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee was established through Resolution 1373 in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Over time, the UN developed a broader institutional architecture involving the Counter-Terrorism Committee, its Executive Directorate, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, sanctions regimes and the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. (United Nations) The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted in 2006, has subsequently been reviewed periodically and in 2026 enters its ninth review, reflecting the continuing evolution of the threat. (United Nations)

What India Learned

For India, the post-9/11 experience reinforced several lessons. First, terrorism cannot be separated from its financing, recruitment, logistics, safe havens and support networks. Second, intelligence must move rapidly across institutional boundaries. Third, counter-terrorism requires international cooperation rather than isolated national responses. And fourth, military action alone cannot eliminate terrorism.

India has consequently developed a broad counter-terrorism engagement extending across the UN, FATF, SCO, BRICS, BIMSTEC, G20, ASEAN, Quad and bilateral Joint Working Groups. India’s Ministry of External Affairs reports that it now maintains Joint Working Groups on counter-terrorism with 26 countries and participates in multiple regional and multilateral mechanisms. (Ministry of External Affairs)

India has also increasingly focused on new and emerging technologies. During India’s 2022 chairmanship of the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, it hosted the special meeting in Mumbai and New Delhi on the misuse of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. The resulting Delhi Declaration called attention to technologies such as drones, cryptocurrencies, encrypted communications and online platforms. (Ministry of External Affairs)

India, the Global South and the Way Forward

India’s counter-terrorism approach is now increasingly connected with its broader Global South diplomacy. Terrorism has disproportionately affected developing regions, particularly parts of Africa, South and West Asia. The UN itself recognises the importance of South-South cooperation, arguing that countries of the Global South can exchange tested experiences, training and institutional knowledge to strengthen prevention and counter-terrorism capacities. (United Nations)

India is contributing to this process through capacity building, information sharing, counter-terror-financing cooperation and training programmes. In 2025, for example, India hosted a programme on countering terrorist financing for Central Asian countries, while India and Central Asian states also agreed to deepen counter-terrorism capacity-building through South-South cooperation and India’s DAKSHIN initiative. (Ministry of External Affairs)

The Indian position, therefore, has evolved from simply demanding a definition to advocating a comprehensive global counter-terrorism architecture, one that addresses financing, technology, radicalisation, terrorist travel, safe havens and cross-border networks while remaining rooted in international law.

The Unfinished Question

Twenty-five years after 9/11, the international response to terrorism has become considerably more elaborate, extending from military and intelligence operations to counter-terror financing, border management, technology, radicalisation and international cooperation. Yet, beneath this expanding architecture lies a question that the international community has still not been able to settle: what, in legal terms, constitutes terrorism? The persistence of this definitional gap is not merely a technical problem. It raises questions about how states exercise political judgement, how certain acts are categorised, and whether a genuinely universal standard can emerge when states continue to differ over questions of resistance, self-determination, armed conflict and state responsibility. India’s longstanding advocacy of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism stems from precisely this concern. The issue, therefore, is larger than arriving at a universally acceptable definition; it concerns whether the international community can develop a framework in which the identity of the perpetrator, the political cause invoked, or the strategic interests of states do not determine whether an act is condemned as terrorism.

For India, the experience of the post-9/11 period has also complicated rather than simplified the understanding of counter-terrorism. The emphasis cannot remain confined to military retaliation after an attack has taken place. Prevention, intelligence cooperation, disruption of financing and logistics, countering radicalisation, addressing emerging technologies and strengthening the capacities of vulnerable states have increasingly become part of the broader response. At the same time, the Global South cannot remain merely the geographical theatre in which terrorism occurs or the recipient of expertise developed elsewhere. Countries that have confronted terrorism over decades possess their own institutional experiences, practices and lessons that can contribute to the international conversation. India’s continuing engagement with the Global South consequently raises a larger possibility: can counter-terrorism become a genuinely cooperative enterprise in which security knowledge moves in multiple directions, rather than being defined primarily by the priorities of the most powerful states? The answers remain unsettled, and perhaps that uncertainty itself is central to understanding where does the battle against terrorism goes from here.