By C.B.P. Srivastava and Kshitij Srivastava

The 18th BRICS Summit, held in New Delhi on 12-13 September 2026, marks an important stage in the evolution of BRICS, from a Grouping seeking greater representation in global governance to one increasingly creating institutions capable of influencing that governance. The real significance of BRICS today lies not merely in declarations, expansion of membership or diplomatic visibility, but in its attempt to redistribute the economic foundations upon which global power ultimately rests. The New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) lie at the centre of this transformation.

From Financial Vulnerability to Financial Capacity

The origins of these institutions must be understood against the weaknesses exposed by the global financial order, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis. Emerging economies were contributing an increasingly significant share of global growth, yet international financial governance remained disproportionately influenced by established Western economies. There was simultaneously a substantial shortage of long term financing for infrastructure and sustainable development in developing countries.

BRICS therefore sought not necessarily to dismantle the IMF & World Bank architecture, but to supplement it and create greater financial policy space for emerging economies. The BRICS development bank proposal emerged at the 2012 New Delhi Summit, was approved at Durban in 2013, and culminated in the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) at Fortaleza in 2014, with US$100 billion authorised capital and US$50 billion subscribed capital. The same Summit also created the US$100 billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) to provide liquidity support against short term balance of payments pressures. Their functions are different but strategically interconnected. The CRA protects financial stability, whereas the NDB creates developmental capacity. One operates as a shield against liquidity shocks; the other channels capital towards infrastructure and sustainable development.

The Power Struggle Triangle

This institutional development can be understood through the concept of the Power Struggle Triangle conceptualised by Mr. C.B.P. Srivastava. The following model places Economic Growth and Military/Defence Strength at the two bases of the triangle, with Political Dominance or Political Influence at its apex.

The proposition of the above Power Struggle Triangle is simple: Durable political influence cannot exist independently of economic and strategic capabilities. Economic strength generates fiscal capacity, technological capability, infrastructure, industrial production and ultimately defence capability. Strategic strength, in turn, protects economic interests and expands diplomatic choices. Political influence emerges when these two foundations acquire sufficient depth.

This corresponds remarkably with an older Indian conception of statecraft. Addressing the Combined Commanders’ Conference in 2005, Dr. Manmohan Singh invoked Kautilya’s observation: From the strength of the treasury, the army is born. He went further to emphasise that modern national power rests not merely upon armed force but also upon economic, scientific, technological, educational and social capacities. BRICS’ financial architecture may therefore be viewed as an attempt to strengthen the economic base of collective strategic autonomy.

NDB: Taking Geopolitics to the Ground

The importance of the NDB lies in converting the abstract idea of multipolarity into visible development. Infrastructure, clean energy, transportation, water and sanitation, social infrastructure and digital systems affect citizens far more directly than summit declarations. This is where geopolitical change reaches the ground.

The NDB has consequently developed beyond the original five BRICS members and expanded its developmental footprint. The 2026 New Delhi Declaration specifically encourages it to mobilise greater resources, diversify funding sources, increase local currency financing, support infrastructure and sustainable development and operate as a strategic development institution for emerging and developing economies. India’s 2026 Chairship also saw the launch of the BRICS-NDB Knowledge Portal, intended to institutionalise development experience and policy learning across members.

Local currency financing is particularly important, as it is not simply a project of de-dollarisation but its more practical purpose is to reduce currency mismatches, exchange rate exposure and dependence upon a single international financing channel.

CRA: Sovereignty Through Resilience

The CRA performs the other half of the equation. Financial crises can rapidly erode foreign exchange reserves, destabilise currencies and restrict sovereign policy choices. A credible liquidity arrangement therefore becomes part of national and collective resilience.

The 2026 Declaration seeks to make the CRA more flexible and responsive during crises, including through amendments to its treaty framework and possible participation by newer BRICS members. A stronger CRA does not merely protect currencies. By limiting financial vulnerability, it protects governments’ ability to preserve development expenditure, infrastructure programmes and broader economic stability during external shocks.

Status Quo, Revisionism and India’s Balancing Role in Global Power Landscape

The contemporary international system is frequently portrayed as a contest between Status Quo Powers, which broadly benefit from the existing distribution of institutional power, and the Revisionist Powers, which seek substantial changes to that distribution. BRICS, however, cannot accurately be placed wholly within either camp.

China and Russia may challenge parts of the existing international order more directly, while several other BRICS members seek greater representation without rejecting the existing system itself. India occupies a particularly important middle position, i.e., a Neutral and/or Non Aligned Country. Its objective is neither automatic preservation of the old order nor disruption for its own sake. India’s approach is better described as Reformist Strategic Autonomy, supporting multipolarity, institutional democratisation and Global South representation while continuing constructive engagement with Western economies and established multilateral institutions.

The 2026 BRICS approach reflects this pragmatism. It promotes local-currency settlements and alternative financial mechanisms while expressly recognising differing national priorities rather than prescribing a single monetary model.

Conclusion: From Balance of Power to Balance of Opportunity

The future relevance of BRICS will depend not only upon how strongly its declarations are worded but whether institutions such as the NDB and CRA can produce measurable economic resilience and development.

For governments, the direction should be towards stronger local currency financing, transparent development lending, resilient financial safety mechanisms and projects capable of producing employment, infrastructure and technological capability. For society, the success of BRICS must be measured not merely by geopolitical influence but by whether international cooperation improves ordinary economic life. For the international community, BRICS should evolve not as an instrument for replacing one form of dominance with another, but as a mechanism for distributing opportunity and decision making more equitably.

The Power Struggle Triangle ultimately contains an important lesson; political power without an economic foundation is fragile, military strength without economic sustainability is temporary, and economic growth without societal development is incomplete. If BRICS can integrate these three realities, it may cease to be merely a participant in the global balance of power and become a guiding force in shaping a more balanced global power landscape.