In August 2007, the late Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, stood before the Indian Parliament and gave a historic speech called the “Confluence of the Two Seas”. Delivered almost two decades ago, even before the Indo-Pacific became the buzzword of 21st-century geopolitics, the former Japanese PM envisioned the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as a strategic space connected by democratic values, maritime trade and a pursuit of freedom and prosperity in the region. In 2026, when the Japanese Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, arrived in Delhi for the 16th India-Japan annual summit, the nature of the question on the Indo-Pacific changed – it is no longer whether the Indo-Pacific exists; it is who will sustain it.
The geopolitical landscape has significantly changed since Abe outlined his vision. China’s military assertiveness, especially in the maritime region of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, is no longer a question of scepticism – it is already well known. Along with this, technological disruptions, supply chain disruptions and increased military presence have shifted to the Indo-Pacific as the world’s primary theatre of geopolitics. And despite all of this, the worry of international relations scholars today comes from an unexpected direction – in regard to the course of American leadership.
As seen, Trump’s return to the White House for the second non-consecutive term in 2025 has changed the course of American foreign policy. A clear preference for transactional alliances, increased burden-sharing by partners and an inward-looking economic agenda (tariff politics) showcase America’s changing strategic behaviour under Trump 2.0. While it cannot be said with certainty whether this represents a temporary shift directed by one President or will become a long-term strategic recalibration, it has created compelling reasons for America’s traditional allies and strategic partners to rethink their assumptions that shape the regional security of the Indo-Pacific. The implications of this evolving geopolitical order will be profound. For the vision of the Indo-Pacific to be sustained, the next phase will have to shift its focus from American leadership to various regional players that can take greater responsibility and contribute to sustaining the discourse of the Indo-Pacific.
So the next question to ask is obvious: is today’s solution lies in replacing the United States? The answer is no, since it is neither realistic nor desirable. The solution resides in strengthening the regional partnerships that are capable of maintaining the architecture of the Indo-Pacific, regardless of the changes occurring in Washington. Against this backdrop, India-Japan is of utmost significance. From economic cooperation to strategic convergence, the India-Japan relationship has shown continuous evolution. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s first official visit to India provided an important opportunity for both nations to further strengthen their bilateral partnership. More significantly, it underscored the growing responsibility of regional powers such as India and Japan to contribute more actively towards regional stability and the realisation of their shared vision for the Indo-Pacific.
This convergence is already visible in the waters. Both countries share concerns over the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to achieve maritime status quo by coercion. Through regular navy exercises (bilateral as well as multilateral), defence cooperation and collaboration under the informal grouping of QUAD, India and Japan have continued to strengthen their partnership. For New Delhi, Tokyo’s growing engagement in the Indian Ocean Region complements its vision of SAGAR and MAHASAGAR. Most importantly, it forwards India’s objective of achieving inclusiveness and helps in countering an aggressive China. For Tokyo, on the other hand, India’s strategic location and its capability as a blue-water navy ensure the safeguarding of the Indo-Pacific’s sea lanes of communication.
Amidst the Russia-Ukraine and USA-Iran-Israel wars and the consequent disruptions in global supply chains, the India-Japan relationship has a strong reason to build a resilient economic network through cooperation. Extending beyond security, the two countries have also shared converging interests in economic growth. From semiconductors to new technologies, from green energy to the blue economy, and from supply chains to digital infrastructure, India and Japan have found growing areas of growth and cooperation.
Most significantly, India and Japan can provide each other perhaps the most relevant yet extremely scarce strategic consistency. In the ever-changing global landscape, both countries have demonstrated a mutual commitment to contribute to each other’s growth with a common vision of a free, open, peaceful, prosperous, and coercion-free Indo-Pacific region. As evident in the India-Japan Joint Vision for the Next Decade, released in 2025, eight directions for achieving a ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’ have been identified. This commitment was further reinforced during the 16th India–Japan Annual Summit, where both Prime Ministers reiterated their responsibility as leading democracies and major economies to shape and uphold a free, open, and rules-based international order. Furthermore, Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomed Japan’s updated Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, underlining its alignment with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) and MAHASAGAR, thereby reiterating the strategic convergence that underpins the two countries’ partnership. Through this, the two countries have expressed their intent to achieve domestic goals and to foster closer ties based on shared ideals of the rule of law, longstanding friendship, and mutual goodwill. This signals the steadfast commitment of the two nations, and in the present scenario, there is no bigger strategic asset than preserving continuity and ensuring momentum.
In this scenario, the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit represented more than a routine diplomatic visit. It came at a time when questions had once again emerged over the future of the Indo-Pacific strategic order and served to reaffirm the shared commitment of both countries to a free, open, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. The visit also demonstrated that regional partners remain both capable of and committed to preserving the regional order amid growing global uncertainties.
