The retraction of the term “Indo” from the hitherto Indo-Pacific US command (USINDOPACOM) to the US Pacific Command (USPACOM), has raised alarming questions over the existence of the newly formed regional identity. The removal of the term from the strategic vocabulary of a major power has made the Indo-Pacific identity stand at crossroads of its survival. However, it does not render the construct entirely obsolete. When major power waver in acknowledging the regions identity, they are the middle powers come up as its custodians, sustaining the construct through collective action. Middle powers are known as “Bridger’s”, “lynchpins” and often “game changers” in the international systems. The scholarly literature largely substantiate middle powers with the capability to influence the international system. At the regional level they are capable of projecting influence by emphasising and empathising with regional affairs, and believe in the coalitional capability of the states pooling resources collective of like-minded states in the region.

An analysis of the policy papers, tracing the shift from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, reveals that term was initially adopted by middle powers in the region, preceding American strategic adoption. The term was first used by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in his speech “Confluence of Two Seas” rendered in the Indian Parliament in 2007. Followed by it, Australia adopted the term in 2012 in the White Paper named “Australia in the Asian Century”. In India, the term appeared in its 2015 maritime policy book, named Ensuring Secure Seas: Maritime Security Strategy. For these states, Indo-Pacific term was not merely rhetorical but manifested pressing concerns regarding maritime safety, stability and the smooth functioning of Sea Lanes of Communication in the trade rich region. Issues such as illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), piracy and hybrid maritime threats became a lexicon in national interests of the states, leading to securitisation of the region, bringing the states into Indo-Pacific constellations. On the other hand, the United States engagement with the Indo-Pacific was largely reactive, emerging from the fear of losing its primacy in the region due to rising China and its massive Belt and Road Initiative announced in 2013. For Washington, the Indo-Pacific became a strategic counter-narrative to Beijing’s rise rather than a response to region’s intrinsic security dilemma. The removal of the term “Indo” from its Pacific Command, is largely reflective of its narrow, and frivolous approach towards the real issues in the region. The USA turned its strategic attention in the region, when it recognised that China’s military, economic and technological power could not be balanced unilaterally. Thus, Washington sought to seek a more “networked” approach shifting from traditional “hub and spokes” system to a minilateral systems, where the coalition of democracies in the region, with “heterarchical” power equations, sought to counterbalance China. Though these setups aimed to address the crucial concerns in the region, ranging from traditional to non-traditional concerns, but the sustainability of these alliances continues to be questioned. This is because of “security/economic disconnect” which means that the middle powers are reluctant to get into alliances that may jeopardise their relation with USA, a major security partner, and China, a major economic partner simultaneously.  Aligning too closely with either would risk high costs, thereby decelerating the pace of architectures such as QUAD.

Under such circumstances, minilateral arrangements, which consist only of middle powers, possess great capacity to leverage regional identity and concerns. States such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Australia and France have emerged as pivotal actors, collaborating on issue-specific agendas in the region without being tethered by the geopolitical rivalry of Washington and Beijing.

The foremost reason that makes the Indo-Pacific construct amenable is the geopolitical and economic realities of middle powers in the region. The majority of states in the region are littorals, thus security of trade and communication remains crucial. The region is enriched by crucial sea lanes of communication that confine the distance and cost of trade. To begin from the Western Indian Ocean, Straight of Hormouz connects Europe and Middle East, moving to the Indian Ocean region, where the 10^th degree channel, between the Andaman and Nicobar islands, connects it to the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok. These channels around Indonesian peninsula provide connectivity to the South China Sea, extending trade pathways up to Australia. Trade trajectories of middle powers are largely influenced by any contention taking place in these choke points due to major power rivalries. For instance, the 46^th ASEAN summit exposed the energy crisis is Southeast Asia due to recent crisis at the Strait of Hormuz, as they depend upon middle east for around 55% of crude oil supplies. Similarly, India imports 85% of liquid natural gasses from the Middle East. Any contention between India-China demand attention in the Indian Ocean Region, largely because of the dual-use Chinese vessels. Moreover the trade bonhomie between Australia and India, also demands a collective approach to ensure the security of the region.

Similarly, the non-traditional security concerns, resemble layered patterns of cabbage petal, distinct yet inseparable, demanding comprehensive responses. Littorals make economy through fishing industry. Activities such as Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU) and piracy are accompanied by human and drug trafficking in the region. According to IUU Fishing Index, Indonesia ranks third most vulnerable state, accompanied by India on the sixth position. Australia has the world’s third largest fishing zone, while Japan’s active engagement is conspicuous in its maritime policy frameworks. In 2024 alone, 64 piracy incidents took place in Singapore, 22 in Indonesian waters and 2 in the South China SEA. While poor governance and economic fragility contribute to these threats, Chinese distant-water vessels have emerged as a central driver.

Thus middle powers in the region, have forged themselves into multiple minilateral/trilateral groupings in the region hedging away from the major-power rivalries, upholding the “rule based order” in the region. These include alignments like India-Australia-Indonesia, India-Australia-Japan, India-Australia-France. They are largely focused on producing public goods including critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, and rare earth metals), defence technologies, pharmaceuticals, textiles, agriculture and renewable energy products. These sectors are central to supply chain resilience and strategic autonomy in the region. By anchoring cooperation and supply chain diversification, middle powers possess great potential in enhancing security in the region, shaping regional order independent of great power rivalries.