The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, officially established in 2001, marked the 25th anniversary of its formation this year. From August 31 to September 1, 2026, Prime Minister Narendra Modi participated in the meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO at Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic. This moment came at a critical juncture when the world order is continuously evolving. Among the five founding members of the SCO, China and Russia constitute two principal powers, with significant economic influence, military power, and geopolitical influence. In 2017, India and Pakistan became members of the SCO, and more recently, in 2023, Iran joined the organisation. The wide variety of SCO members showcases the diverse composition of this intergovernmental organisation with varying political interests and strategic goals. Regardless of the challenge posed by its membership, this diversity of members provides New Delhi with a platform to manoeuvre to achieve its strategic goals and further its interests in Eurasia.

As evident from Prime Minister Modi’s statement, India values and shares a vision based on three pillars of joint work– Security, Connectivity, and Opportunity– showcasing New Delhi’s priorities with its membership in SCO. The strategic space offered by SCO is valuable for India, providing direct access to Central Asian nations, simultaneous engagement with Russia and China, and an institutional platform to foster issue-based cooperation while managing its commitment to strategic autonomy and advancing its strategic goals and national interests. New Delhi’s participation in SCO, therefore, provides it with strategic leverage, contrary to what many critics argue, to operate among competing power centres sans any formal commitment to bloc politics or alliance formations.

Perhaps, the security domain, as highlighted by the SCO outcome document, remains the most important dimension for New Delhi with utmost diplomatic value. The “double standards” in the fight against terrorism were condemned, and any manifestation of terrorism was denounced as unacceptable. Most importantly, approval on the regulations for a Universal Centre for Countering Challenges and Threats to the Security of SCO Member States was also announced as a key outcome. In fact, Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his statement at the Summit, categorically mentioned peace and security as the first and foremost requirement for achieving the three main pillars of India’s SCO vision, stating that terrorism is a major challenge.

The Prime Minister stated that the use of terrorism as a state policy cannot be a strategic asset and that providing a safe haven and support to terrorism needs strong messaging from all. This statement is important in the context of the fact that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shebaz Sharif was present at the summit. He also called for dismantling “the entire ecosystem of terrorist financing, recruitment, radicalisation, and safe havens”.  The terrorism problem posed by Pakistan is a major security threat for India, and New Delhi has not shied away from calling out terrorism as a policy instrument by the states. PM’s statement that “we cannot remain confined to an action-reaction approach” tells the same message that was delivered post Operation Sindoor, that retaliatory action against Pakistan’s terror and military camps is only suspended and that a befitting response by India is and will remain the new normal. Most importantly, the relevance of this position lies in the fact that it was expressed at a platform where Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia and other member states were present, rather than remaining limited to India’s bilateral partnership.

The Bishkek outcome also mentioned cooperation among SCO partners against terrorism, extremism, organised crime and other transnational threats and in order to achieve this objective, to enhance coordination and information exchange on transnational security threats. Furthermore, Regulations on the Executive Committee of the SCO Anti-Narcotics Centre were approved, as in line with India’s efforts against cross border narcotics terrorism and narcotics trafficking. SCO therefore provides India an important platform to express its concerns and utilise it as an instrument of agenda setting. While New Delhi might not be able to compel other states to recognise Pakistan as a terrorism enabling state, it has certainly pushed terrorism as the key agenda requiring top most preference in collaboration, institutional cooperation and multilateral support for principles utmost vital to its own security.

It should also be noted this engagement for New Delhi is not limited to, and extends beyond security. Collaboration has expanded to include various areas including energy, climate change, disaster management, artificial intelligence, information sharing, youth and innovation, as evident in the Bishkek declaration. One of India’s initiatives such as  SCO Young Scientists Forum was accepted as well as youth cooperation was emphasised. The SCO Civilisational Dialogue Forum will also be held in India this year, as welcomed by the leaders. One must, therefore, ask why these outcomes matter for India’s strategic goals- firstly, it allows India to translate its own domestic capabilities and diplomatic priorities into regional goals. Not just as a key security player in the region, India can project its capabilities through AI cooperation and scientific exchanges, by leading in digital technologies and development and showcasing its abilities in various other dimensions. Secondly, through SCO, India can strengthen its relationship and connectivity with the Central Asian states and expand its influence to a broader region where connectivity, geography, geopolitics, energy and resources are closely intertwined. To some extent, the hindrance created by Pakistan in accessing the Central Asian region and lack of connectivity with the region, can be compensated through institutional engagements and alternatives to find new avenues for strengthening the relationship of India with Central Asian states. In this sense, SCO creates an opportunity for India to find a practical solution to the problem of connectivity and thereby, contribute to the larger regional order.

Most importantly, India’s SCO participation reveals significant insights about its approach to strategic autonomy. While some might argue that India’s engagement with SCO implies convergence with China and Russia, it is important to remember that India engages simultaneously with the United States, Japan, Australia through Quad and various other minilaterals of Indo-Pacific powers. If anything, India’s participation in SCO is only one component of India’s multi-alignment strategy and its steadfast commitment to maintain its strategic autonomy. In addition to participation at SCO, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Vladimir Putin, assessing progress on India-Russia bilateral cooperation and ensuring mutual commitment to strengthen the Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership of the two countries. The strategic environment provided by summits of SCO, thereby, also compliments bilateral diplomacy. However, the next annual SCO summit in 2027 will pose a significant challenge for India, as Pakistan assumes the chairmanship under the theme “Turning Vision into Action: Connectivity, Innovation and Shared Prosperity”. It is now to observe how New Delhi would manoeuvre and sustain its institutional participation amidst bilateral tensions and continue to maintain its strategic autonomy amidst competing geopolitical pressures in an evolving order.