As India takes the BRICS chair in 2026, the test before the grouping is no longer whether it joins the global space economy, but whether participation builds capacity or entrenches diplomacy. A governance network, dependency mapping, lunar dialogue, and capacity chains could provide BRICS with the foundations to move from participating in existing rules to shaping the rules of the emerging space order.

India assumes a consequential role as BRICS Chair in 2026. The grouping now comprises 11 members and represents roughly 40 percent of the global GDP and nearly half of the world’s population. Yet its significance will increasingly depend not on scale alone, but on whether it can translate that scale into institutional and technological agency.

Space offers an immediate test.

In June 2026, India hosted the BRICS Head of Space Agencies meeting in Bengaluru. Discussions covered the BRICS Remote Sensing Satellite Constellation, space sustainability, capacity building, greater private-sector engagement, and the proposed BRICS Space Council, building on a steady institutionalization of space cooperation within the grouping, from space agencies forum to joint remote-sensing projects. India has also called for the emergence of a “BRICS Space Economy” connecting innovation, investment, entrepreneurship and sustainable development.

The direction is promising. But ahead of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi, India should push the conversation one step further.

The strategic question is no longer whether BRICS should participate in the global space economy. It is whether participation will produce greater capability or new forms of dependency.

 The Space Economy Comes with an Existing Architecture

BRICS is entering an ecosystem whose institutional foundations are already well developed.

The UN space treaties remain the foundation of international space law. Around them, however, an increasingly complex architecture has emerged involving national agencies, regional institutions, research organizations, private companies, data providers and commercial infrastructure.

The Artemis Accords illustrate this evolution. Established by the United States and partner countries in 2020, the non-binding Accords seek to establish common principles for civil exploration of the Moon, Mars and other celestial bodies. India became the 27^th signatory in 2023. By August 2023, the number of signatories had grown to 28; by August 2026, it had risen to 70, a demonstration of how quickly such arrangements acquire international reach.

For India, participation is valuable. International cooperation can accelerate scientific discovery, interoperability, technological development and access to future lunar missions.

But participation also has a less visible dimension.

Space activity increasingly depends on terrestrial infrastructure: semiconductors, critical minerals, launch systems, satellite components, cloud computing, ground stations and data processing platforms. Satellites require semiconductors, advanced materials, precision manufacturing and launch infrastructure, and the supply chains behind them have repeatedly proven vulnerable to disruption. Dependence on any one technological ecosystem can therefore become a strategic vulnerability.

Europe itself recognizes this. Technological non-dependence and strategic autonomy are explicit objectives of EU space industrial policy, and the Commission is already investigating Europe’s strategic dependencies across critical technologies. The EU’s 2023 Space Strategy for Security and Defense goes further, emphasizing the protection of critical space infrastructure and the reduction of strategic dependencies.

The lesson for BRICS should be straightforward: interdependence is unavoidable; unmanaged dependency is not.

 India Has More Leverage Than Before

India enters this debate from a considerably stronger position than a decade ago.

Private investment in India’s space sector increased almost six-fold, from US$100.5 million in 2021-22 to US$618.5 million by March 2026. By mid-2026, 113 authorizations had been issued to 52 non-government entities for activities ranging from satellite operations to payloads and launch services.

This changes India’s negotiating position.

India need not choose between participation in US and European led initiatives and cooperation within BRICS. Its strategic advantage lies precisely in its ability to engage across these ecosystems.

The objective should be participation without dependency: interoperability without technological lock-in; access to international data without permanent data dependence; commercial partnerships without market capture; and international rule making without surrendering the ability to shape those rules.

 The Moon Makes This Urgent

The urgency becomes clearer as space activity moves beyond Earth orbit.

Lunar exploration is evolving towards longer-term infrastructure, scientific installations, communications, navigation and potentially resource utilization. The Artemis Accords already address issues including interoperability, scientific data, space resources, deconfliction of activities and orbital debris.

The question of emerging space powers is therefore not simply who reaches the Moon, but who helps determine the rules once sustained activity begins.

Questions of resource utilization, environmental protection, debris, scientific sites, infrastructure access and commercial activity cannot be treated only after economic interests have become entrenched.

India and Brazil, in particular, can help BRICS avoid false choice between accepting existing frameworks wholesale and constructing rival institutions. BRICS should instead develop the expertise and institutional capacity to negotiate, complement and, where necessary, challenge emerging norms.

 Four Priorities for India at BRICS

First, establish a BRICS Space Governance Network. The proposed Space Council should not become another closed intergovernmental institution. It should connect space agencies with industry, universities, legal experts, and research institutions. BRICS needs a mechanism through which technical expertise can inform policy before positions are negotiated internationally.

Second, map strategic space dependencies. BRICS should undertake a collective assessment of vulnerabilities across critical minerals, semiconductors, satellite components, launch infrastructure, cloud services, ground systems, and space-derived data. Europe already assesses critical technological dependencies as part of its pursuit of strategic autonomy; BRICS requires its own understanding of where dependence becomes vulnerability.

Third, launch a BRICS Lunar Governance Dialogue. Rather than waiting for lunar commercial activity to mature, BRICS should begin developing positions on resource utilization, sustainability, scientific heritage, debris, data access and long-term human presence. This need not compete with the Artemis Accords or UN processes. It should ensure that BRICS members arrive at those forums with developed positions rather than responding individually to rules shaped elsewhere.

Fourth, build capacity chains and not merely supply chains. A resilient space economy requires more than access to components. BRICS needs engineers who can build them, companies that can commercialize them, lawyers who understand the emerging regulatory system, and diplomats capable of negotiating its rules. Joint fellowships, university programmes, industry placements and policy research should therefore form part of BRICS space cooperation.

Sustainability should cut across all four priorities. Orbital congestion, debris and eventually the environmental consequences of sustained lunar activity cannot become externalities addressed after commercial expansion.

 From Participation to Agency

BRICS does not need a parallel space order.

Nor should India distance itself from the United States, Europe or existing international institutions. India’s advantage lies in maintaining multiple partnerships while ensuring that no one becomes an irreversible technological or institutional dependency.

The opportunity before BRICS is therefore subtler and potentially more consequential. It can provide emerging space powers with the collective capacity to participate in global frameworks while retaining the ability to shape them.

As the space economy expands from Earth orbit towards sustained lunar activity, decisions about infrastructure, standards, resources, data, and sustainability made today could become the institutional defaults of tomorrow. India should use its BRICS chair ship to ensure that emerging economies are not simply present when those decisions are implemented. They should be present when they are made.

Participation without dependency should become the organising principle of BRICS engagement with the emerging space economy.